# IAM Review Checklist

> **Intro:** This checklist focuses on human and non-human access, trust policies, privilege boundaries, and the path by which powerful actions happen.

## Best time to use this checklist

Use it for new roles, service accounts, federation trust, break-glass paths, admin workflows, and platform changes.

## Stop-the-line conditions

* wildcard or broad admin privilege without strong business justification;
* long-lived static credentials for automation where federation is possible;
* unclear mapping between identity, owner, and purpose;
* transitive trust that lets one compromised system pivot into another.

## Text-first review prompts

* Which actor or workload identity is using this permission?
* Is the privilege scoped to specific resources, actions, and environments?
* What trust assumption lets this identity exist or assume a more powerful role?
* How short-lived is the credential material?
* What logs prove that the identity acted, and what alerts watch for misuse?
* What would an attacker gain if this identity were compromised?

## Evidence table

| Control area        | What to verify                                                   | Typical evidence             |
| ------------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------- | ---------------------------- |
| Identity purpose    | Every identity has a clear owner and business purpose            | IAM inventory, owner mapping |
| Privilege scope     | Permissions are limited to required actions and resources        | policy review, diff          |
| Trust               | Federation, assume-role, and service-account trust is understood | trust policy, OIDC config    |
| Credential lifetime | Short-lived credentials are used where possible                  | STS config, token lifetime   |
| Detection           | Use of privileged identities is logged and monitored             | audit logs, detections       |

## Common misses

* reviewing permissions without reviewing trust relationships;
* ignoring who can edit the role instead of who can use the role;
* failing to separate development and production authority;
* forgetting that an overpowered CI identity is often a production risk, not only a build risk.

## Related pages

* [Workload Federation and Non-Human Identities](/architecture-api-crypto-and-identity/index-2/workload-federation-and-non-human-identities.md)
* [Cloud Change Review Checklist](/learning-labs-interview-and-templates/index-3/cloud-change-review-checklist.md)
* [Provider-Specific Cloud Attack Chains](/attack-paths-testing-detection-and-hardening/index-1/cloud-attack-chains.md)

\---*Author attribution: Ivan Piskunov, 2026 - Educational and defensive-engineering use.*


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